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A DERIVATIVES MARKET IN
LEGAL ACADEMIA
Paul H. Edelman†

I

ABSTRACT: Building on the success of derivatives markets
in the financial arena, I show how similar markets can be
used to hedge risk in legal academia. Prudent use of these
markets will generate cash, mitigate errors in hiring, and
increase the academic prestige of law schools. In short, they
can do for legal academia what they have already done to
the financial world.

there is considerable comfort
in being ensconced in legal academia. Unemployment does not
lie in wait for those of us fortunate enough to be tenured. To
be sure some of the perquisites of the profession – free meals,
a nice travel budget, maybe a laptop or two – may be pruned, but
those are small quibbles in the face of lay-offs at major firms or 3Ls
who seek permanent jobs while servicing a large debt. We really
have little about which to complain.
One area where shrunken endowments do manifest themselves
meaningfully, though, is in the inability to hire. In these times the
errors of past recruitments come to the fore. Hiring is a risky endeavor. The Brilliant Supreme Court clerk (BSC) who seemed a
sure thing decides to spend his time marketing haiku on the interN TUMULTUOUS ECONOMIC TIMES
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net. The fellow from Harvard with the stellar recommendations
develops writer’s block and is unable to finish a manuscript. Or the
former associate at Cravath decides to pursue a second career in
mathematics and spends all of her time teaching calculus. Mistakes
happen. Are law schools destined to absorb these mistakes? Perhaps
there is a way to hedge this risk?
This short essay outlines just such a way to hedge errors in legal
academia. Borrowing from the notorious success of such financial
leaders as Lehman Brothers and AIG, I propose a derivatives market
for legal academia. By bundling the various academic assets from
the faculty, and tranching them appropriately, a law school will be
able to hedge its errors in hiring, reinvigorate its own scholarly profile, and perhaps even supplement its revenue. The risk can be managed and all will benefit.1
Consider the problem of High-theory Law School (HLS). It is
about to hire the BSC, but there is uncertainty as to whether he will
write anything that might burnish the HLS brand. On the other side
is Our Little Sisters of the Poor Law School (OLSPLS), which desires to advance its scholarly profile but is unable to hire any candidates who are likely to do so. Suppose that HLS bought a put from
OLSPLS for the writing of the BSC. If the papers that the BSC
writes are not very good, HLS can ship them off with any citation
counts, page counts, etc., now credited to OLSPLS. OLSPLS
makes some money on the front end and, even if the put is exercised, gets credited for some scholarship that it would not likely get
any other way. HLS is protected from low quality work for a small
price. The downside risk to HLS of hiring the BSC is hedged, and
OLSPLS potentially gets some exposure that it would never see
otherwise.
Call options might be of use in this situation, too. Suppose the
BSC’s production is voluminous but the marginal benefit to HLS of
his twelfth article in a year is small. It might be more efficient for
1

You may wonder about the wisdom of introducing derivatives in this market
given their less than stellar reputation in other areas of the economy. In response
I will remind you that all the great cutting-edge insights in legal academia arrived
many years after they had been repudiated in their fields of origin.
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HLS to sell a call on the BSC’s work to OLSPLS. HLS makes some
money on the transaction and can avoid the dilution of its brand as
long as the article produced by the BCS exceeds the less than stringent standards of OLSPLS. On the other hand, OLSPLS can guarantee an improvement of its scholarly profile without the significant
expense of maintaining the BSC.
There may well be other parties interested in these futures. Law
reviews might be interested in buying calls on certain faculty. Indeed, some law reviews might even be interested in buying puts, so
they can unload an article by a home faculty member that is not
worth publishing. The possibilities are limitless.
Having seen the opportunities available there is no turning back.
Consider HLS once again. Given its eminence, it hardly needs any
of its faculty to publish. Scholarship could be turned into a revenue
stream. HLS could bundle its faculty’s work and sell off the whole
stream of articles to other law schools or law reviews. Of course
even the fine scholarship from HLS has some variations, so we
might want to tranch the offering into different qualities. That is,
sell off the top 10% of the articles for one price, the next 10% at
another, and so forth. To do this we would need an independent
auditor of academic quality. Surely once the market niche is available someone will come and fill it. U.S News has demonstrated acumen in assessing legal quality. The AALS is also well-positioned to
play this role. I am sure that the two together would provide the
same reliable ratings that we have come to expect from Standard &
Poor’s and Moody’s in the financial context.
But what would happen if HLS somehow defaulted on its production of papers? Law reviews, waiting for their papers to arrive,
would have nothing to publish. The whole academic endeavor
might creak to a halt. How can we protect against this (incredibly
unlikely) scenario? Once again we can turn to the financial markets
for inspiration. Some law school might insure the appearance of
scholarship by offering legal academe default swaps. In the unlikely
case that HLS should fail to produce an adequate supply, the professors at Crank-it-out Law School (CLS) will, for a fee, guarantee to
provide substitute articles. If CLS were to insure too many acaWINTER 2009

159

Paul H. Edelman
demic streams, and if they were to all default, there might be a
problem. No article can be published in more than one law review
(at least not without changing the title and abstract, and those are
often the most difficult things to do well), and CLS might not be
able to fully meet the contract. But surely this scenario is unlikely,
and we can count on the ethical behavior of the leadership at CLS to
avoid this moral hazard.2
A different approach to hedging risk might be to allow options
on the faculty themselves. That is, if OLSPLS were to sell a put on
the BSC, then HLS would have the option of actually sending him
away if his work were below standard. It would be far cheaper than
denying tenure.3 There are obvious contractual issues that arise4
should we take the market to this level. But if endowments were to
drop a little more . . . .

2
3
4

But cf. AIG.
I imagine that the put market would spike after faculty meetings, as well.
And possibly constitutional ones, as well. See the 13th amendment.
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